First Expedition of Constantine. – Despite the disapproval of the government and the refusal of reinforcements, the gen. Clauzel, gathered 8000 men, drawn from the garrisons of Oran and Algiers, and 14 pieces with few provisions and ammunition, moved on November 13 from Bona; after a very painful march in the rain and snow, he arrived on the 22nd in front of Constantina who, contrary to forecasts, was found in a perfect state of defense. Lacking siege pieces, after a vain attempted assault, on the 24th the gen. Clauzel had to order a retreat which, with the Arabs at his heels, became disastrous; on 10 December the expedition returned to Bona in pitiful conditions, after having lost over 1000 men. Clauzel was recalled and was succeeded by gen. Damrémont, who, with the aim of having his hands free against the Bey of Constantina, tried to ensure peace in the other areas and charged the gen. Bugeaud to come to an agreement with Abd el-Kader; the emir, who did not ask for better after the setback he suffered, adhered to the treaty of Tafna (May 30, 1837), with which France officially recognized him the dominion of the provinces of Oran, Algiers and Titeri, minus the cities of Oran, Mostaganem, Algiers and the immediate surroundings; the treaty was, in essence, worse for France than the one signed by Desmichels, especially since Bugeaud, who proved to be really too accommodating, neglected to fix the eastern frontiers of the emirate, leaving the door open to the ambitions of Abd el- Kader precisely towards that province of Constantina that the French were preparing to conquer. with which France officially recognized the dominion of the provinces of Oran, Algiers and Titeri, minus the cities of Oran, Mostaganem, Algiers and the immediate surroundings; the treaty was, in essence, worse for France than the one signed by Desmichels, especially since Bugeaud, who proved to be really too accommodating, neglected to fix the eastern frontiers of the emirate, leaving the door open to the ambitions of Abd el- Kader precisely towards that province of Constantina that the French were preparing to conquer. with which France officially recognized the dominion of the provinces of Oran, Algiers and Titeri, minus the cities of Oran, Mostaganem, Algiers and the immediate surroundings; the treaty was, in essence, worse for France than the one signed by Desmichels, especially since Bugeaud, who proved to be really too accommodating, neglected to fix the eastern frontiers of the emirate, leaving the door open to the ambitions of Abd el- Kader precisely towards that province of Constantina that the French were preparing to conquer.
Second Expedition of Constantine. – Therefore obtained a fictitious peace, the gen. Damrémont concentrated in Guelma, halfway between Bona and Constantina, 13,000 men with 16 field guns, 17 siege guns and a large supply (more than twenty days of food).
The expedition left Guelma on 1 October and arrived on the 6th in front of Constantina, who was regularly besieged; on the 12th a breach was already opened in the walls, but the gen. Damrémont, approaching to recognize her closely, was killed. The gen. Valée, assuming command, decided to attack for day 13. Three columns (Combes, Lamoricière and Corbin) launched the assault and penetrated Constantina, which was conquered house by house; the defenders, rather than surrender, rushed from the walls into the deep ravine of the Rummel where almost all perished; Bey Ahmed managed to escape and take refuge in the Aurès mountains.
The capture of Constantine led to the submission of almost the entire province, and the gen. Valée, appointed governor, busily set about reorganizing the forces and administration of the colony.
Meanwhile Abd el-Kader, taking advantage of the truce, had managed to enormously strengthen his material and moral position by subduing the recalcitrant tribes to him with the help of France and constituting a real well-organized state, with a regular army of 12,000 men. (trained in European style by deserters) and 20 artillery pieces.
Two years after the signing of the Tafna treaty, he was able to resume hostilities.
Second phase of the fight against Abd el-Kader. – Abd el-Kader, interpreting the treaty of Tafna to his advantage, challenged the French for the right to go east of Mitidja and therefore to communicate by land between Algiers and Constantine.
And when Marshal Valée, regardless of these demands, carried out a great military march with 6000 men from Philippeville to Algiers for Constantine, Sétif, el-Biban and Mitidja, Abd el-Kader, denouncing the treaty, declared war on France (20 November) and undoubtedly invaded and devastated Mitidja and the surroundings of Algiers, proclaiming the holy war.
The governor, taken aback, procrastinated, limiting himself to partial operations (taking of Médéa, Miliana and Cherchell) with no other tangible result than serious losses and a few episodes of value (heroic defense of the Masaghan fort). Finally the government of Louis Philippe decided to act vigorously and, having replaced Marshal Valée with gen. Bugeaud (December 1840). despite the precedent of the treaty of Tafna, it increased the troops of Algeria to 100,000 men. For Algeria 2018, please check ethnicityology.com.
Bugeaud understood the uselessness of a war consisting in supplying too many garrisons, and conceived the design of acting with mobile columns leaning on a few but strong and well-equipped bases, and of such strength as to be always able, not only to resist in all circumstances, but to report tangible successes everywhere.
No more dispersion of forces, no more small posts, small columns and heavy convoys. Skilfully making use of the means widely provided to him, regardless of traditions, he established new war procedures, suggested to him by his personal experience and his innate practical sense, not neglecting to instill in the employees the conviction of the goodness of his methods, so that everyone knew in every operation what you wanted to achieve and what you had to do. In 1841-42 the forts built by Abd el-Kader (Tasa, Boghari, Sebdou, Tagdemt) were destroyed, and Mascara and Tlemcen occupied, from which the Lamoricière and Bedeau divisions radiated. Abd el-Kader had to retreat to the Ouarsenis mountains, where he struggled for a long time to avoid a decisive battle. Finally in 1843 the Bugeaud managed to encircle the plateau of the Ouarsenis from N. to E., occupying the course of the Oued Chélif, on whose left bank he founded the entrenched fields of Orléansville and Boghari; to O. Sidi Bel-Abbès, to S. Tiaret. During these operations there were numerous battles, as a result of which Abd el-Kader subsequently lost most of his regular forces and all his warehouses and arsenals which constituted his material power. On the verge of being captured, he abandoned the Ouarsenis with his followers, constituting a mass of 60,000 people, including 5,000 combatants, and set out on the campaign; the operations then assumed a character of extreme mobility and forced the French troops to that manhunt, in which they perfected the aptitude for rapid movements necessary for this kind of war. In the spring of 1843 it became known that theAbd el-Kader’s sm ā lah (mobile camp) stood on the highlands between Tiaret and Boghar; the Lamoricière division from Tiaret and the brigade of the Duke of Aumale from Boghar set out in search of him; on May 16, the vanguard of the latter, made up of 500 horses, managed to surprise the Arab camp by capturing 3000 prisoners and cattle; but the bulk, including Abd el-Kader’s family, managed to escape. Too much importance was given to this episode and the emir was considered by now lost, but he instead continued to beat the campaign by recruiting new fighters; in the end, seriously beaten in numerous new fights, on the point of being encircled, he took refuge in Moroccan territory, asking for and obtaining the protection of the sultan ‛Abd er-Raḥmān.
